For all practical purposes, the event that has by all reasonable reaches shaped every single development worldwide for the past 90 years finds itself with fewer and fewer people that have an active memory of participating in it, albeit tangentially:
AP:
Harry Richard Landis, who enlisted in the Army in 1918 and was one of only two known surviving U.S. veterans of World War I, has died. He was 108.
Landis trained as a U.S. Army recruit for 60 days at the end of the war and never went overseas. But the VA counts him among the 4.7 million men and woman who served during the Great War.
One has to reflect on the apparent fact that we as a race of beings haven't really learned much from past horrors that we have inflicted on each other when the last vestiges of a generation that endured them are passing away like a wisp of smoke and all we can do is mention them in passing while focusing on persecuting similar and even greater horrors on the latest fellow members of the human race that happen to be in the way of "progress":
Seattle Times:
BAGHDAD — The U.S. military faced complaints Tuesday from its Sunni allies over claims that more civilians had been killed by American forces — amplifying tensions as the Pentagon tries to calm anger over an airstrike last week that claimed innocent lives.
The latest deaths occurred Tuesday when U.S. soldiers — acting on tips — stormed a squat mud-brick house in the village of Adwar, 10 miles south of Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. The predominantly Sunni area is home to many former members of Saddam's regime, and has been the frequent site of American raids.
The U.S. military said a gunbattle broke out after the troops came under small-arms fire by two suspected terrorists. It acknowledged a woman was killed and a child was wounded, but said it was not clear who shot them.
Two other men were killed and the military described them as insurgents.
But Iraqi police, relatives and neighbors said a couple and their 19-year-old son were shot to death in their beds. Iraqi police also said two girls were wounded and one later died.
How does that catchy phrase go about history and those who ignore it being doomed to a predetermined path of repetition?
Showing posts with label U. S. Troops. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U. S. Troops. Show all posts
Thursday, February 7, 2008
Friday, October 5, 2007
The Power of One
Minneapolis, 2007:
1st Lt. Jon Anderson said he never expected to come home to this: A government refusing to pay education benefits he says he should have earned under the GI bill.
"It's pretty much a slap in the face," Anderson said. "I think it was a scheme to save money, personally. I think it was a leadership failure by the senior Washington leadership... once again failing the soldiers."
Anderson's orders, and the orders of 1,161 other Minnesota guard members, were written for 729 days.
Had they been written for 730 days, just one day more, the soldiers would receive those benefits to pay for school.
"Which would be allowing the soldiers an extra $500 to $800 a month," Anderson said.
That money would help him pay for his master's degree in public administration. It would help Anderson's fellow platoon leader, John Hobot, pay for a degree in law enforcement.
Chicago, 1919:
Eddie Cicotte: You said if I won 30 games this year there'd be a $10,000 bonus.
Charles Comiskey: So?
Cicotte: I think you owe it to me.
Comiskey: Harry, how many games did Mr. Cicotte win for us this year?
Harry: 29, sir.
Cicotte: You had [Sox manager] Kid [Gleason] bench me for two whole weeks in August. I missed five starts.
Comiskey: We had to rest your arm for the [World] Series.
Cicotte: I would have won at least two of those games -- and you knew that.
Comiskey: I have to keep the best interests of the club in mind, Eddie.
Cicotte: I think you owe me that bonus.
Comiskey: 29 is not 30, Eddie. You will get only the money you deserve. (Pause) Anything else?
Cicotte: No, Mr. Comiskey. That's it.
-Eight Men Out, 1988
1st Lt. Jon Anderson said he never expected to come home to this: A government refusing to pay education benefits he says he should have earned under the GI bill.
"It's pretty much a slap in the face," Anderson said. "I think it was a scheme to save money, personally. I think it was a leadership failure by the senior Washington leadership... once again failing the soldiers."
Anderson's orders, and the orders of 1,161 other Minnesota guard members, were written for 729 days.
Had they been written for 730 days, just one day more, the soldiers would receive those benefits to pay for school.
"Which would be allowing the soldiers an extra $500 to $800 a month," Anderson said.
That money would help him pay for his master's degree in public administration. It would help Anderson's fellow platoon leader, John Hobot, pay for a degree in law enforcement.
Chicago, 1919:
Eddie Cicotte: You said if I won 30 games this year there'd be a $10,000 bonus.
Charles Comiskey: So?
Cicotte: I think you owe it to me.
Comiskey: Harry, how many games did Mr. Cicotte win for us this year?
Harry: 29, sir.
Cicotte: You had [Sox manager] Kid [Gleason] bench me for two whole weeks in August. I missed five starts.
Comiskey: We had to rest your arm for the [World] Series.
Cicotte: I would have won at least two of those games -- and you knew that.
Comiskey: I have to keep the best interests of the club in mind, Eddie.
Cicotte: I think you owe me that bonus.
Comiskey: 29 is not 30, Eddie. You will get only the money you deserve. (Pause) Anything else?
Cicotte: No, Mr. Comiskey. That's it.
-Eight Men Out, 1988
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Motivation
GIs' morale dips as Iraq war drags on
With tours extended, multiple deployments and new tactics that put them in bare posts in greater danger, they feel leaders are out of touch with reality.
"I don't see any progress. Just us getting killed," said Spc. Yvenson Tertulien, one of those in the dining hall in Yousifiya, 10 miles south of Baghdad, as Bush's speech aired last month. "I don't want to be here anymore."
Arthur's latest post highlights the oft overlooked and/or actively denied reality of the deliberate manner in which the U. S. has forced its will upon the nations of the world merely for the sake of doing so.
He cites a passage from The March of Folly by Barbara Tuchman, part of which follows:
Wooden-headedness, the "Don't-confuse-me-with-the-facts" habit, is a universal folly never more conspicuous than at upper levels of Washington with respect to Vietnam. Its grossest fault was underestimation of North Vietnam's commitment to its goal. Enemy motivation was a missing element in American calculations, and Washington could therefore ignore all the evidence of nationalist fervor and of the passion for independence which as early as 1945 Hanoi had declared "no human force can any longer restrain." Washington could ignore General Leclerc's prediction that conquest would take half a million men and "Even then it could not be done." It could ignore the demonstration of elan and capacity that won victory over a French army with modern weapons at Dien Bien Phu, and all the continuing evidence thereafter.
American refusal to take the enemy's grim will and capacity into account has been explained by those responsible on the ground of ignorance of Vietnam's history, traditions and national character: there were "no experts available," in the words of one high-ranking official. But the longevity of Vietnamese resistance to foreign rule could have been learned from any history book on Indochina. Attentive consultation with French administrators whose official lives had been spent in Vietnam would have made up for the lack of American expertise. Even superficial American acquaintance with the area, when it began to supply reports, provided creditable information. Not ignorance, but refusal to credit the evidence and, more fundamentally, refusal to grant stature and fixed purpose to a "fourth-rate" Asiatic country were the determining factors, much as in the case of the British attitude toward the American colonies. The irony of history is inexorable.
The colonial Americans were committed to their independence from the rule of Imperial England under George III in a much stronger way than the British army regulars and hired Hessian guns were to quelling the rebellion (insurgency?).
Andrew Bacevich(h/t Arthur):
The communists of North Vietnam were less interested in promoting world revolution than in unifying their country under socialist rule. We deluded ourselves into thinking that we were defending freedom against totalitarianism.
They were much more committed to this goal than the French and later U. S. forces were to stopping the misperceived push for worldwide totalitarian revolution (which was ill communicated to the ranks anyway)
Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the insurgent groups are all similar in at least one way: They all want to see the U.S. out of the region physically, politically, and economically. They don't want to destroy our way of life, they just want to be able to live their way of life in their homeland(s). The fact that we may not agree with some of what that way of life entails (and there are some egregious facets to it to be sure) and that we don't like the way they want to develop natural resources that rightfully belong to them is not an acceptable motive for our actions over the past several decades.
The attempt to tell these people what to do, when to do it, and to do all of it with a smile and shows of grateful subservience only serves to strengthen the resolve of these people to resist these efforts. They're not stupid. They know when they're being told what to do. And it's certainly not the first time, either.
With tours extended, multiple deployments and new tactics that put them in bare posts in greater danger, they feel leaders are out of touch with reality.
"I don't see any progress. Just us getting killed," said Spc. Yvenson Tertulien, one of those in the dining hall in Yousifiya, 10 miles south of Baghdad, as Bush's speech aired last month. "I don't want to be here anymore."
Arthur's latest post highlights the oft overlooked and/or actively denied reality of the deliberate manner in which the U. S. has forced its will upon the nations of the world merely for the sake of doing so.
He cites a passage from The March of Folly by Barbara Tuchman, part of which follows:
Wooden-headedness, the "Don't-confuse-me-with-the-facts" habit, is a universal folly never more conspicuous than at upper levels of Washington with respect to Vietnam. Its grossest fault was underestimation of North Vietnam's commitment to its goal. Enemy motivation was a missing element in American calculations, and Washington could therefore ignore all the evidence of nationalist fervor and of the passion for independence which as early as 1945 Hanoi had declared "no human force can any longer restrain." Washington could ignore General Leclerc's prediction that conquest would take half a million men and "Even then it could not be done." It could ignore the demonstration of elan and capacity that won victory over a French army with modern weapons at Dien Bien Phu, and all the continuing evidence thereafter.
American refusal to take the enemy's grim will and capacity into account has been explained by those responsible on the ground of ignorance of Vietnam's history, traditions and national character: there were "no experts available," in the words of one high-ranking official. But the longevity of Vietnamese resistance to foreign rule could have been learned from any history book on Indochina. Attentive consultation with French administrators whose official lives had been spent in Vietnam would have made up for the lack of American expertise. Even superficial American acquaintance with the area, when it began to supply reports, provided creditable information. Not ignorance, but refusal to credit the evidence and, more fundamentally, refusal to grant stature and fixed purpose to a "fourth-rate" Asiatic country were the determining factors, much as in the case of the British attitude toward the American colonies. The irony of history is inexorable.
The colonial Americans were committed to their independence from the rule of Imperial England under George III in a much stronger way than the British army regulars and hired Hessian guns were to quelling the rebellion (insurgency?).
Andrew Bacevich(h/t Arthur):
The communists of North Vietnam were less interested in promoting world revolution than in unifying their country under socialist rule. We deluded ourselves into thinking that we were defending freedom against totalitarianism.
They were much more committed to this goal than the French and later U. S. forces were to stopping the misperceived push for worldwide totalitarian revolution (which was ill communicated to the ranks anyway)
Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the insurgent groups are all similar in at least one way: They all want to see the U.S. out of the region physically, politically, and economically. They don't want to destroy our way of life, they just want to be able to live their way of life in their homeland(s). The fact that we may not agree with some of what that way of life entails (and there are some egregious facets to it to be sure) and that we don't like the way they want to develop natural resources that rightfully belong to them is not an acceptable motive for our actions over the past several decades.
The attempt to tell these people what to do, when to do it, and to do all of it with a smile and shows of grateful subservience only serves to strengthen the resolve of these people to resist these efforts. They're not stupid. They know when they're being told what to do. And it's certainly not the first time, either.
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